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Learning Actions Models: Qualitative Approach
Thomas Bolander and Nina Gierasimczuk
Abstract. In dynamic epistemic logic, actions are described using ac-
tion models. In this paper we introduce a framework for studying learn-
ability of action models from observations. We present first results con-
cerning propositional action models. First we check two basic learnabil-
ity criteria: finite identifiability (conclusively inferring the appropriate
action model in finite time) and identifiability in the limit (inconclu-
sive convergence to the right action model). We show that deterministic
actions are finitely identifiable, while non-deterministic actions require
more learning power—they are identifiable in the limit. We then move
on to a particular learning method, which proceeds via restriction of
a space of events within a learning-specific action model. This way of
learning closely resembles the well-known update method from dynamic
epistemic logic. We introduce several different learning methods suited
for finite identifiability of particular types of deterministic actions.
Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) allows analyzing knowledge change in a sys-
tematic way. The static component of a situation is represented by an epistemic
model, while the structure of the dynamic component is encoded in an action
model. An action model can be applied to the epistemic model via so-called
product update operation, resulting in a new up-to-date epistemic model of the
situation after the action has been executed. A language, interpreted on epis-
temic models, allows expressing conditions under which an action takes effect
(so-called preconditions), and the effects of such actions (so-called postcondi-
tions). This setting is particularly useful for modeling the process of epistemic
planning (see [7,1]): one can ask which sequence of actions should be executed
in order for a given epistemic formula to hold in the epistemic model after the
actions are executed.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate possible learning mechanisms
involved in discovering the ‘internal structure’ of actions on the basis of their
executions. In other words, we are concerned with qualitative learning of action
models on the basis of observations of pairs of the form (initial state, resulting
state). We analyze learnability of action models in the context of two learn-
ing conditions: finite identifiability (conclusively inferring the appropriate action
model in finite time) and identifiability in the limit (inconclusive convergence to
the right action model). The paper draws on the results from formal learning
theory applied to DEL (see [11,13,12]).
Learning of action models is highly relevant in the context of epistemic plan-
ning. A planning agent might not initially know the effects of her actions, so she
will initially not be able to plan to achieve any goals. However, if she can learn
the relevant action models through observing the effect of the actions (either
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by executing the actions herself, or by observing other agents), she will eventu-
ally learn how to plan. Our ultimate goal is to integrate learning of actions into
(epistemic) planning agents. In this paper, we seek to lay the foundations for
this goal by studying learnability of action models from streams of observations.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 1 we recall the basic
concepts and notation concerning action models and action types in DEL. In
Section 2 we specify our learning framework and provide general learnability
results. In Section 3 we study particular learning functions, which proceed via
updating action models with new information. Finally, in Section 4 we indicate
how to lift our results from the level of individual action learning to that of
action library learning. In the end we briefly discuss related and further work.
1 Languages and action types
Let us first present the basic notions required for the rest of the article (see [6,8]
for more details). Following the conventions of automated planning, we take the
set of atomic propositions and the set of actions to be finite. Given a finite set
P of atomic propositions, we define the (single-agent) epistemic language over
P , Lepis(P ), by the following BNF: φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | Kφ, where p ∈ P .
The language Lprop(P ) is the propositional sublanguage without the Kφ clause.
When P is clear from the context, we write Lepis and Lprop instead of Lepis(P )
and Lprop(P ), respectively. By means of the standard abbreviations we introduce
the additional symbols →, ∨, ↔, ⊥, and ⊤.
Definition 1 (Epistemic models and states). An epistemic model over a
set of atomic propositions P isM = (W,R, V ), whereW is a finite set of worlds,
R ⊆ W ×W is an equivalence relation, called the indistinguishability relation,
and V : P → P(W ) is a valuation function. An epistemic state is a pointed
epistemic model (M, w) consisting of an epistemic model M = (W,R, V ) and a
distinguished world w ∈W called the actual world.
A propositional state (or simply state) over P is a subset of P (or, equivalently,
a propositional valuation ν : P → {0, 1}). We identify propositional states and
singleton epistemic models via the following canonical isomorphism. A proposi-
tional state s ⊆ P is isomorphic to the epistemic modelM = ({w}, {(w,w)}, V )
where V (p) = {w} if p ∈ s and V (p) = ∅ otherwise. Truth in epistemic states
(M, w) withM = (W,R, V ) (and hence propositional states) is defined as usual
and hence omitted.
Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) introduces the concept of an action model
for modelling the changes to states brought about by the execution of actions
[6]. We here use a variant that includes postconditions [8,7], which means that
actions can have both epistemic effects (changing the beliefs of agents) and ontic
effects (changing the factual states of affairs).
Definition 2 (Action models). An action model over a set of atomic propo-
sitions P is A = (E,Q, pre, post), where E is a finite set of events; Q ⊆ E ×E
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is an equivalence relation called the indistinguishability relation; pre : E →
Lepis(P ) assigns to each event a precondition; post : E → Lprop(P ) assigns to
each event a postcondition. Postconditions are conjunctions of literals (atomic
propositions and their negations) or ⊤.1 dom(A) = E denotes the domain of A.
The set of all action models over P is denoted Actions(P ).
Intuitively, events correspond to the ways in which an action changes the epis-
temic state, and the indistinguishability relation codes (an agent’s) ability to
recognize the difference between those different ways. In an event e, pre(e) spec-
ifies what conditions have to be satisfied for it to take effect, and post(e) specifies
its outcome.
Example 1. Consider the action of tossing a coin. It can be represented by the
following action model (h means that the coin is facing heads up):
A = e1 : 〈⊤, h〉 e2 : 〈⊤,¬h〉
We label each event by a pair whose first argument is the event’s precon-
dition while the second is its postcondition. Hence, formally we have A =
(E,Q, pre, post) with E = {e1, e2}, Q is the identity on E, pre(e1) = pre(e2) =
⊤, post(e1) = h and post(e2) = ¬h. The action model encodes that tossing the
coin will either make h true (e1) or h false (e2).
Definition 3 (Product update). Let M = (W,R, V ) and A =
(E,Q, pre, post) be an epistemic model and action model (over a set of atomic
propositions P ), respectively. The product update of M with A is the epis-
temic model M⊗A = (W ′, R′, V ′), where W ′ = {(w, e) ∈ W × E | (M, w) |=
pre(e)}; R′ = {((w, e), (v, f)) ∈ W ′ ×W ′ | wRv and eQf}; V ′(p) = {(w, e) ∈
W ′ | post(e) |= p or ((M, w) |= p and post(e) 6|= ¬p)}. For e ∈ dom(A), we
define M⊗ e =M⊗ (A ↾ {e}).
The product update M⊗A represents the result of executing the action A in
the state(s) represented by M.
Example 2. Continuing Example 1, consider a situation of an agent seeing a
coin lying heads-up, i.e., the singleton epistemic state M = ({w}, {w,w}, V )
with V (h) = {w}. Let us now calculate the result of executing the coin toss in
this model.
M⊗A = (w1, e1) : h (w1, e2) :
Here each world is labelled by the propositions being true at the world.
We say that two action models A1 and A2 are equivalent, written A1 ≡ A2,
if for any epistemic model M, M⊗A1↔M⊗A2, where ↔ denotes standard
bisimulation on epistemic models [17].
1 We are here using the postcondition conventions from [7], which are slightly non-
standard. Any action model with standard postconditions can be turned into one of
our type, but it might become exponentially larger in the process [8,7].
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1.1 Action types
We can identify a number of different action types.
Definition 4 (Action types). An action model A = (E,Q, pre, post) is:
– atomic if |E| = 1.
– deterministic if all preconditions are mutually inconsistent, that is, |=
pre(e) ∧ pre(f)→ ⊥ for all distinct e, f ∈ E.
– fully observable if Q is the identity relation on E. Otherwise it is partially
observable.
– precondition-free if pre(e) = ⊤ for all e ∈ E.
– propositional if pre(e) ∈ Lprop for all e ∈ E.
– universally applicable if |=
∨
e∈E pre(e).
– normal if for all propositional literals l and all e ∈ E, pre(e) |= l implies
post(e) 6|= l.
– with basic preconditions if all pre(e) are conjunctions of literals (proposi-
tional atoms and their negations).
– with maximal preconditions if all pre(e) are maximally consistent conjunc-
tions of literals (i.e., preconditions are conjunctions of literals in which each
atomic proposition p occurs exactly once, either as p or as ¬p).
Some of the notions defined above are known from existing literature [7,8,16].
The newly introduced notions are precondition-free, universally applicable, and
normal actions, as well as actions with basic preconditions. Note that action
types interact with each other, atomic actions are automatically both determin-
istic and fully observable, and precondition-free actions can only be deterministic
if atomic.2
In the remainder of this section we set a uniform representation of action
models that we will later on use in learning methods. We also specify and justify
the restrictions we impose on action models.
Propositionality In this paper we are concerned with product updates of
propositional states with propositional action models. Let s denote a propo-
sitional state over P , and let A = (E,Q, pre, post) be any propositional ac-
tion model. Using the definition above and the canonical isomorphism between
propositional states and singleton epistemic states, we get that s⊗A is isomor-
phic to the epistemic model (W ′, R′, V ′), where W ′ = {e ∈ E | s |= pre(e)},
R′ = {(e, f) ∈ W ′ × W ′ | eQf}, V ′(p) = {e ∈ W ′ | post(e) |= p or (s |=
p and post(e) 6|= ¬p)}. If A is fully observable, then the indistinguishability of
s⊗A is the identity relation. This means that we can think of s⊗A as a set of
propositional states (via the canonical isomorphism between singleton epistemic
models and propositional states). In this case we write s′ ∈ s⊗A to mean that s′
is one of the propositional states in s⊗A. When A is atomic we have s⊗ a = s′
for some propositional state s′ (using again the canonical isomorphism).
2 The actions considered in propositional STRIPS planning (called set-theoretic plan-
ning in [9]) correspond to epistemic actions that are atomic and have basic post-
conditions.
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Example 3. Consider the action model A of Example 1 (the coin toss). It is a
precondition-free, fully observable, non-deterministic action. Consider an initial
propositional state s = {h}. Then s⊗A is the epistemic model of Example 2. It
has two worlds, one in which h is true, and another in which h is false. So we have
∅, {h} ∈ s ⊗ A, i.e., the outcome of tossing the coin is either the propositional
state where h is false (∅) or the one where h is true ({h}).
Basic preconditions and normality When preconditions are basic, pre- and
postconditions are of the same simple normal form, they are conjunctions of
literals. Below we show that any propositional action model can be turned into
an action model having this normal form. We also show that we can ensure all
action models to be normal.
Proposition 1. Any propositional action model is equivalent to a normal action
model with basic preconditions.
Proof sketch. Take a propositional action model (E,Q, pre, post). We first make
the preconditions basic in the following way. Take any event e ∈ E with precon-
dition φ. Turn φ into disjunctive normal form
∨
i∈I
∧
j∈J pij . Then replace e by
a set of events ei, i ∈ I, where post(ei) = post(e) and pre(ei) =
∧
j∈J pij . Each
ei is connected by a Q-edge to every event e was originally connected to. This
is done for each event e ∈ E. It is easy to see that the resulting action model
(E′, Q′, pre′, post′) has basic preconditions and is equivalent to the original one.
We now “normalise” post′ into a new mapping post′′ in order to obtain an
equivalent normal action model (E′, Q′, pre′, post′′). Note that since the action
model (E′, Q′, pre′, post′) has basic preconditions, the normality condition can
be expressed in a particularly simple way: for all literals l and all e ∈ E, if l is a
conjunct of pre(e) then it is not a conjunct of post(e). For each event e ∈ E, we
now define post′′(e) from post′(e) by deleting each conjunct of post′(e) which is
also a conjunct in pre′(e). It is easy to see that this gives an equivalent action
model: consider an event e and a literal l which is both a conjunct of pre′(e) and
post′(e). Since l is a conjunct of pre′(e), l has to be true for e to occur. Since l is
a conjunct of post′(e), l will also be true after the event e has occurred. Hence,
the event e does not affect the truth value of l, and we get an equivalent event
by removing l from the postcondition.
In this paper we are only going to be concerned with propositional actions, and
so, due to Proposition 1, we can restrict attention to normal actions having basic
preconditions.
Universal applicability The condition for being universally applicable intu-
itively means that the action specifies an outcome no matter what state it is
applied to. In this paper we will only be concerned with universally applicable
action models. To understand the reason for this restriction consider the example
of an action open door with singleton action model 〈¬open∧¬locked, open〉, i.e.,
if the door is currently closed and unlocked, performing open door will open it.
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This action model does not specify what happens if an agent attempts open door
when the door is either already open or is locked. We can easily fix this by adding
another event to the action model, 〈open∨ locked,⊤〉, expressing that if one tries
to open it when locked or already open, nothing happens. More generally, any
action model A = (E,Q, pre, post) which is not universally applicable can be
turned into a universally applicable action model by adding the following event:
〈¬ ∨e∈E pre(e),⊤〉. If an agent is learning results of an action, she should in
any possible state be able to attempt executing the action, and hence the action
model should specify an outcome of this attempt. For this reason, we require
universal applicability.
2 Learning action models
First we will focus on learning an individual action, i.e., inferring semantics of a
single action name. The semantics of an action name is an action model. In the
following we will use the expressions action and action model interchangeably.
Below we will first present general results on learnability of various types of
action models, and then, in Section 3, we study particular learning methods and
exemplify them.
We are concerned with learning fully observable actions (action models).
Partially observable actions are generally not learnable in the strict sense to
be defined below. Consider for instance an agent trying to learn an action that
controls the truth value of a proposition p, but where the agent cannot observe
p (events making p true and events making p false are indistinguishable). Then
clearly there is no way for that agent to learn exactly how the action works.
The case of fully observable actions is much simpler. If initially the agent has
no uncertainty, her “belief state” can be represented by a propositional state.
Executing any sequence of fully observable actions will then again lead to a
propositional state. So in the case of fully observable actions, we can assume
actions to make transitions between propositional states.
For the rest of this section, except in examples, we fix a set P of atomic
propositions.
Definition 5. A stream E is an infinite sequence of pairs (s, s′) of propositional
states over P , i.e., E ∈ (P(P ) × P(P ))ω. The elements (s, s′) of E are called
observations. Let N := N+ ∪ {0}, let E be a stream over P , and let s, t ∈ P(P ).
En stands for the n-th observation in E. E [n] stands for the the initial segment
of E of length n, i.e., E0, . . . , En−1. set(E) := {(x, y) | (x, y) is an element of E}
stands for the set of all observations in E; we similarly define set(E [n]) for initial
segments of streams.
Definition 6. Let E be a stream over P and A a fully observable action model
over P . The stream E is sound with respect to A if for all (s, s′) ∈ set(E),
s′ ∈ s ⊗ A. The stream E is complete with respect to A if for all s ⊆ P and
all s′ ∈ s ⊗ A, (s, s′) ∈ set(E). In this paper we always assume the streams to
be sound and complete. For brevity, if E is sound and complete wrt A, we will
write: ‘E is for A’.
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Definition 7 (Learning function). A learning function is a computable L :
(P(P )× P(P ))∗ → Actions(P ) ∪ {↑}.
In other words, a learning function takes a finite sequence of observations (pairs
of propositional states) and outputs an action model or a symbol corresponding
to ‘undecided’.
We will study two types of learning: finite identifiability and identifiability in
the limit. First let us focus on finite identifiability. Intuitively, finite identifiability
corresponds to conclusive learning: upon observing some finite amount of action
executions the learning function outputs, with certainty, a correct model for the
action in question (up to equivalence). This certainty can be expressed in terms
of the function being once-defined: it is allowed to output an action model only
once, there is no chance of correction later on. Formally, we say that a learning
function L is (at most) once defined if for any stream E for an action over P and
n, k ∈ N such that n 6= k, we have that L(E [n])=↑ or L(E [k])=↑.
Definition 8. Let X be a class of action models and A ∈ X , L be a learning
function, and E be a stream. We say that:
1. L finitely identifies A on E if L is once-defined and there is an n ∈ N s.t.
L(E [n]) ≡ A.
2. L finitely identifies A if L finitely identifies A on every stream for A.
3. L finitely identifies X if L finitely identifies every A ∈ X .
4. X is finitely identifiable if there is a function L which finitely identifies X .
The following definition and theorem are adapted from [15,14,13].
Definition 9. Let X ⊆ Actions(P ). A set DA ⊆ P(P )×P(P ) is a definite finite
tell-tale set (DFTT ) for A in X if
1. DA is sound for A (i.e., for all (s, s′) ∈ DA, s′ ∈ s⊗A),
2. DA is finite, and
3. for any A′ ∈ X , if DA is sound for A′, then A ≡ A′.
Lemma 1. X is finitely identifiable iff there is an effective procedure D : X →
P(P(P )× P(P )), given by A 7→ DA, that on input A produces a definite finite
tell-tale of A.
Proof. [⇒] Assume that X is finitely identifiable. Then there is a computable
function L that finitely identifies X . We use that function to define D. Once the
learning function L identifies an action A it has to give it as a definite output,
and this will happen for some E [n]. We then set D(A) = set(E [n]). It is easy
to check that such D(A) is a definite tell-tale set. [⇐] Assume that there is an
effective procedure D : X → P(P(P ) × P(P )), that on input A produces a
definite finite tell-tale of A. Take an enumeration of X an take any A ∈ X and
any E for A. We use D to define the learning function. At each step n ∈ N, L
compares E [n] with D(A1), . . . ,D(An). Once, at some step ℓ ∈ N, it finds Ak
such that D(Ak) ⊆ set(E [ℓ]), it outputs Ak. It is easy to verify that then Ak ≡ A.
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In other words, the finite set of observations DA is consistent with only one
action A in the class (up to equivalence of actions). D is a computable function
that gives a DA for any action A.
Theorem 1. For any finite set of propositions P the set of (fully observable)
deterministic propositional actions over P is finitely identifiable.
Proof. We use Lemma 1, and hence define D: D(A) = {(s, s′) | s ⊗ A =
s′, where s, s′ ∈ P(P )}. Let us check that indeed D(A) is a DFTT for A. We
need to show conditions 1, 2 and 3 of Definition 9 for D(A). 1: D(A) is sound for
A, trivially. 2: D(A) is finite, because P is finite. 3: Let us take any propositional
action A′ such that D(A) is sound for A′. This means, by the definition of D
above and the fact that A and A′ are deterministic, that for all propositional
states s, s′ over P , if s⊗A = s′ then s⊗A′ = s′. It follows that s⊗A = s′⊗A′ for
all propositional states s, and hence A ≡ A′ (since A and A′ are propositional).
Finally, D is computable because P is finite.
Example 4. Theorem 1 shows that deterministic actions are finitely identifiable.
We will now show that this does not carry over to non-deterministic actions, that
is, non-deterministic actions are in general not finitely identifiable. Consider the
action of tossing a coin, given by the action model A in Example 1. If in fact the
coin is fake and it will always land tails (so it only consists of the event e2), in
no finite amount of tosses the agent can exclude that the coin is fair, and that
heads will start appearing in the long run (that e1 will eventually occur). So
the agent will never be able to say “stop” and declare the action model to only
consist of e2. This argument can be generalised, leading to the theorem below.
Theorem 2. For any finite set of propositions P the set of arbitrary (including
non-deterministic) fully observable propositional actions over P is not finitely
identifiable.
Proof. Assume that the set of arbitrary propositional actions over A is finitely
identifiable. Then there is a learning function L that finitely identifies it. Among
such actions we will have two, A and A′, such that A′ = A ↾ D(A′).3 Let us now
construct a stream E on which L fails to finitely identify one of them. Let the
E start with enumerating all pairs of propositional states that are sound for the
smaller action, A′, and keep repeating this pattern. Since this is a stream for
A′ indeed the learning function has to at some point output an equivalent of A′
(otherwise it fails to finitely identify A′, which leads to contradiction). Assume
that this happens at some stage n ∈ N. Now, observe that E [n] is sound with
respect to A too, so starting at the stage n+1 let us make E enumerate the rest
of remaining pairs of propositional states consistent with A. That means that
there is a stream E for A on which L does not finitely identify A. Contradiction.
3 For any action model A = (E,Q, pre, post) and any subset E′ ⊆ E we define a ↾ E′
as the restriction of A to the domain E′, that is, a ↾ E′ = (E′, Q′, pre′, post′) where
Q′ = Q ∩ (E′)2, pre′ = pre ↾ E′ and post′ = post ↾ E′.
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A weaker condition of learnability, identifiability in the limit, allows widening
the scope of learnable actions, to cover also the case of arbitrary actions. Identifi-
ability in the limit requires that the learning function after observing some finite
amount of action executions outputs a correct model (up to equivalence) for the
action in question and then forever keeps to this answer (up to equivalence) in all
the outputs to follow. This type of learning can be called ‘inconclusive’, because
certainty cannot be achieved in finite time.
Definition 10. Let X be a class of action models and A ∈ X , L be a learning
function, and E be a stream. We say that:
1. L identifies A on E in the limit if there is k ∈ N such that for all n ≥ k,
L(E [n]) ≡ A.
2. L identifies A in the limit if L identifies A in the limit on every E for A.
3. L identifies X in the limit if L identifies in the limit every A ∈ X .
4. X is identifiable in the limit if there is an L which identifies X in the limit.
The following theorem is adapted from [2].
Theorem 3. For any finite set of propositions P the set of (fully observable)
propositional actions over P is identifiable in the limit.
Proof. The argument is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. Analogously to the
concept of definite finite tell-tale set, we define a weaker notion of finite tell-
tale set (FTT). Let P be a set of propositions and let X ⊆ Actions(P ). A set
DA ⊆ P(P )×P(P ) is a finite tell-tale set (FTT ) for A in X if: 1. DA is sound
for A (i.e., for all (s, s′) ∈ DA, s′ ∈ s⊗A); 2. DA is finite, and 3. for any A′ ∈ X ,
if DA is sound for A′, then A ≡ A′ ↾ X , where X ⊆ dom(A′).
Similarly to the argument for Lemma 1 one can show that X is identifiable
in the limit iff there is an effective procedure D : X → P(P(P ) × P(P )), given
by A 7→ DA, that on input A enumerates a finite tell-tale of A. We will omit
the proof for the sake of brevity.
Now it is enough to show that indeed such a function D can be given for the
set of arbitrary (fully observable, propositional) actions over P . Define D(A) =
{(s, s′) | s′ ∈ s ⊗ A, where s, s′ ∈ P(P )}. Let us check that indeed D(A) is a
FTT for A. 1: D(A) is sound for A, trivially. 2: D(A) is finite, because P is finite.
3: Let us take any propositional action A′ such that D(A) is sound for A′. This
means, by the definition of D above that for all propositional states s, s′ over P ,
if s′ ∈ s⊗ A then s′ ∈ s ⊗A′. This implies that s⊗ A is a submodel of s⊗A′
for all propositional states s, and hence that A is equivalent to a submodel of
A′ (since actions are propositional).
Finally, again D is computable because P is finite.
Having established the general facts about finite identifiability and identifia-
bility in the limit of propositional fully-observable actions, we will now turn to
studying particular learning methods suited for such learning conditions.
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3 Learning actions via update
Standard DEL, and in particular public announcement logic, deals with learning
within epistemic models. If an agent is in a state described by an epistemic model
M and learns from a reliable source, that φ is true, her state will be updated
by eliminating all the worlds where φ is false. That is, the model M will be
restricted to the worlds where φ is true. This can also be expressed in terms of
action models, where the learning of φ corresponds to taking the product update
of M with the event model 〈φ,⊤〉 (public announcement of φ).
Now we turn to learning actions rather than learning facts. Actions are
represented by action models, so to learn an action means to infer the action
model that describes it. Consider again the action model A of Example 1. The
coin toss is non-deterministic and fully observable: either h or ¬h will non-
deterministically be made true and the agent is able to distinguish these two
outcomes (no edge between e1 and e2). However, we can also think of A as the
hypothesis space of a deterministic action, that is, the action A is in fact deter-
ministically making h true or false, but the agent is currently uncertain about
which one it is. Given the prior knowledge that the action in question must be
deterministic, learning the action could proceed in a way analogous to that of
update in the usual DEL setting.
It could for instance be that the agent knows that the coin is fake and always
lands on the same side, but the agent initially does not know which. After
the agent has executed the action once, she will know. She will observe either
h becoming false or h becoming true, and can hence discard either e1 or e2
from her hypothesis space. She has now learned the correct deterministic action
model for tossing the fake coin. Note the nice symmetry to learning of facts:
here, learning of facts means eliminating worlds in epistemic models, learning of
actions means eliminating events in action models.
In the rest of this section, all action models are silently assumed to be: fully
observable, propositional, and universally applicable. Furthermore, we can as-
sume them to be normal and have basic preconditions, due to Proposition 1.
3.1 Learning precondition-free atomic actions
We will first propose and study an update learning method especially geared
towards learning the simplest possible type of ontic actions: precondition-free
atomic actions.
Definition 11. For any deterministic action model A and any pair of
propositional states (s, s′), the update of A with (s, s′) is defined by
A | (s, s′) := A ↾ {e ∈ E | if pre(e) |= s then s⊗ e = s′}. For a set
S of pairs of propositional states, we define: A | S := A ↾ {e ∈
E | for all (s, s′) ∈ S, if pre(e) |= s then s⊗ e = s′}.
The update A | (s, s′) restricts the action model A to the events that are con-
sistent with observing s′ as the result of executing the action in question in the
state s.
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Definition 12. The update learning function for precondition-
free atomic actions over P is the learning function L1 defined by
L1(E [n]) = A
1
init | set(E [n]) where A
1
init = (E,Q, pre, post) with
E = {ψ | ψ is a consistent conjunction of literals over P}; Q is the iden-
tity relation on E × E; pre(e) = ⊤ for all e ∈ E; post(ψ) = ψ.
In Figure 1 we show a generic example of such update learning for P = {p, q}.
p∧q
p
⊤
q
¬p∧qp∧¬q
¬q ¬p
¬p∧¬q
p∧q
p
Fig. 1. On the left hand side A1init for P = {p, q}, together with sets corresponding
to possible observations. We have labelled each event e by post(e). On the right hand
side the state of learning after observing E0 = ({q}, {p, q}).
Theorem 4. The class of precondition-free atomic actions is finitely identifiable
by the update learning function Lupdate1 , defined in the following way:
L
update
1 (E [n]) =


L1(E [n]) if card(dom(L1(E [n]))) = 1
and for all k < n, Lupdate1 (E [k]) = ↑;
↑ otherwise.
Proof. Let A denote a precondition-free atomic action over P , and let E be a
stream for A. We show that Lupdate1 finitely identifies A on E . First note that
L
update
1 is obviously (at most) once-defined. Further, we need to show that for
some n ∈ N, Lupdate1 (E [n]) ≡ A. By definition of L
update
1 , it is the case only if
card(dom(A1init | set(E [n]))) = 1 and (A
1
init | set(E [n])) ≡ A.
Since A is atomic and precondition-free, it must consist of a single event of
the form 〈⊤, ψ〉. By definition of A1init (Definition 12), this implies that there is
an event e ∈ dom(A1init) such that A = A
1
init ↾ {e}. Since E is a stream for A, e
is in A1init | set(E [n]).
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By Theorem 1 we know that A is finitely identifiable, so, by Lemma 1, there
is a DFTT DA for A. Since E is for A and DA is by definition finite and sound
for A, there is n ∈ N such that DA ⊆ set(E [n]). By definition of DFTT and
of A1init we get that for all e
′ ∈ A1init such that e
′ 6= e there is (s, s′) in E [n]
such that s ⊗ e′ 6= s′, and hence e′ is not in A1init | set(E [n]). To see why that
is assume the contrary, i.e., that there is an e′ ∈ Ainit, e′ 6= e such that for all
(s, s′) ∈ E [n] we have s⊗ e′ = s′. Then DA is also sound for the singleton action
model containing only e′. But this contradicts that DA is a DFTT for A (since
all pairs of distinct events in A1init are inequivalent).
Combining the above we get that A1init | set(E [n]) contains exactly one event,
e, and hence A1init | set(E [n]) = A
1
init ↾ {e} = A, showing the required.
3.2 Learning deterministic actions with preconditions
We now turn to learning of action models with preconditions. First we only treat
the case of maximal preconditions, then afterwards we generalise to arbitrary
(not necessarily maximal) preconditions.
Definition 13. The update learning function for deterministic action mod-
els with maximal preconditions over P is the learning function L2 defined by
L2(E [n]) = A2init | set(E [n]) where A
2
init = (E,Q, pre, post) with E = {(φ, ψ) |
φ is a maximally consistent conjunction of literals over P and ψ is a conjunction
of literals over P not containing any of the conjuncts of φ }; Q is the identity
on E × E; pre((φ, ψ)) = φ; post((φ, ψ)) = ψ.
Theorem 5. The class of deterministic action models with maximal precondi-
tions is finitely identifiable by the following update learning function Lupdate2 .
L
update
2 (E [n]) =


L2(E [n]) if for all e, e
′ ∈ dom(L2(E [n]))
if e 6= e′, then pre(e) 6= pre(e′)
and for all k < n, Lupdate2 (E [k]) = ↑;
↑ otherwise.
Proof. Consider any event e = 〈φ, ψ〉 in A. Its precondition φ is a maximally con-
sistent conjunction of literals over P . Due to normality, its postcondition ψ can
not contain any of the conjunctions of φ. Hence e must be identical to one of the
events of A2init. In other words, A must be isomorphic to a restriction/submodel
of A2init.
Let E be a stream for A. We show that Lupdate2 finitely identifies A on E .
L
update
2
is obviously (at most) once-defined. Further, we need that for some
n ∈ N, Lupdate2 (E [n]) ≡ A. By Theorem 1 we know that A is finitely identifiable,
so, by Lemma 1, there is a DFTT DA for A, and hence there is n ∈ N such that
DA ⊆ set(E [n]). Firstly, note that all distinct e, e′ ∈ dom(L2(E [n])) have distinct
preconditions pre(e) 6= pre(e′). Here a similar argument applies as in the proof of
Theorem 4. This gives us that Lupdate2 is guaranteed to give an answer. Secondly,
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we have to show that for any k < n, if for all distinct e, e′ ∈ dom(L2(E [k])) it
is the case that pre(e) 6= pre(e′), then L2(E [k]) ≡ A. Take any k < n, there are
two cases. If E [k] does not include a DFTT for A, then there are two distinct
e, e′ ∈ L2(E [k]) such that pre(e) = pre(e′). If E [k] includes a DFTT for A,
then actions A′ 6≡ A have been eliminated from A2init by step k, and hence
L2(E [k]) ≡ A.
Example 5. Consider a simple scenario with a pushbutton and a light bulb. As-
sume there is only one proposition p: ‘the light is on’, and only one action:
pushing the button. We assume an agent wants to learn the functioning of the
pushbutton. There are 4 distinct possibilities: 1) the button does not affect the
light (i.e., the truth value of p); 2) it is an on button: it turns on the light
unconditionally (makes p true); 3) it is an off button: it turns off the light un-
conditionally (makes p false); 4) it is an on/off button (flips the truth value of
p). If the agent is learning by update, it starts with the action model A2init con-
taining the following events: 〈p,⊤〉, 〈¬p,⊤〉, 〈p,¬p〉, and 〈¬p, p〉. Note that by
definition A2init does not contain the events 〈p, p〉 and 〈¬p,¬p〉, since they both
have a postcondition conjunct which is also a precondition conjunct. Assume
the first two observations the learner receives (the first elements of a stream E)
are (∅, {p}) and ({p}, ∅). Since the agent uses learning by update, she revises her
model as follows (cf. Definition 13):
〈p,⊤〉 〈¬p,⊤〉
〈p,¬p〉 〈¬p, p〉
〈p,⊤〉
✘
✘
✘〈¬p,⊤〉
〈p,¬p〉 〈¬p, p〉
✘
✘✘〈p,⊤〉
✘
✘
✘〈¬p,⊤〉
〈p,¬p〉 〈¬p, p〉
A2init A
2
init | E0 A
2
init | E0 | E1
observation E0 :
(∅, {p})
observation E1 :
({p}, ∅)
Now the agent has reached a deterministic action model A2init | set(E [2]), and
can report this to be the correct model of the action, cf. Theorem 5. Note that
the two observations correspond to first pushing the button when the light is
off (E0), and afterwards pushing the button again after the light has come on
(E1). These two observations are sufficient to learn that the pushbutton is of
the on/off type (it has one event that makes p true if p is currently false, and
another event making p true if currently false).
Consider now another stream E ′ where the first two elements are (∅, {p}) and
({p}, {p}). Update learning will now work as follows:
〈p,⊤〉 〈¬p,⊤〉
〈p,¬p〉 〈¬p, p〉
〈p,⊤〉
✘
✘
✘〈¬p,⊤〉
〈p,¬p〉 〈¬p, p〉
〈p,⊤〉
✘
✘
✘〈¬p,⊤〉
✘
✘
✘〈p,¬p〉 〈¬p, p〉
A2init A
2
init | E0 A
2
init | E0 | E1
observation E ′0 :
(∅, {p})
observation E ′1 :
({p}, {p})
This time the learner identifies the button to be an on button, again after only
two observations. It is not hard to show that in a setting with only one proposi-
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tional symbol p, any deterministic action will be identified after having received
the first two distinct observations.
Example 6. Consider learning the functioning of an n-bit binary counter, where
the action to be learned is the increment operation. For i = 1, . . . , n, we use the
proposition ci to denote that the ith least significant bit is 1. Consider first the
case n = 2. A possible stream for the increment operation is the following:
(∅, {c1}), ({c1}, {c2}), ({c2}, {c2, c1}), ({c2, c1}, {∅}), · · ·
0 0 → 0 1
c2 c1 c2 c1
0 1 → 1 0
c2 c1 c2 c1
1 0 → 1 1
c2 c1 c2 c1
1 1 → 0 0
c2 c1 c2 c1
· · ·
Using the update learning method on this stream, it is easy to show that the
learner will after the first 4 observations be able to report the correct action
model containing the following events: 〈¬c2 ∧ ¬c1, c1〉, 〈¬c2 ∧ c1, c2 ∧ ¬c1〉, 〈c2 ∧
¬c1, c1〉, 〈c2 ∧ c1,¬c2 ∧ ¬c1〉. Note that since A2init has maximal preconditions,
the action model learned for an n-bit counter will necessarily contain 2n events:
one for each possible configuration of the n bits. If we did not insist on maximal
preconditions, we would only need n + 1 events to describe the n-bit counter:
〈¬ci ∧ ci−1 ∧ ci−2 ∧ · · · ∧ c1, ci ∧ ¬ci−1 ∧ ¬ci−2 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬c1〉 for all i = 2, . . . , n,
〈¬c1, c1〉 and 〈cn ∧ · · · ∧ c1,¬cn ∧ · · · ∧ ¬c1〉. This means that there is room for
improvement in our learning method.
To allow learning of deterministic action models where preconditions are not
required to be maximal we need a different learning condition. Consider learn-
ing an action on P = {p} that sets p true unconditionally. With non-maximal
preconditions, all of the following events would be consistent with any stream
for the action: 〈⊤, p〉, 〈¬p, p〉, 〈p,⊤〉. To get to a deterministic action model, the
learning function would have to delete either the first or the two latter events.
We can make it work as described in the following.
For any action model A we define
min(A) = A ↾ {e | there is no event e′ 6= e with pre(e) |= pre(e′)}.
Furthermore, we define L3 to be exactly like L2 of Definition 13 except in the def-
inition of E, φ can be any conjunction of literals, not only maximally consistent
ones.
Theorem 6. The class of deterministic action models is finitely identifiable by
the following update learning function Lupdate3 .
L
update
3 (E [n]) =


min(L3(E [n])) if for all s ∈ P(P ) there exists an s′ s.t.
(s, s′) ∈ set(E [n]) and for all k < n,
L
update
3 (E [k]) = ↑;
↑ otherwise.
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The proof of this theorem is left out. The theorem can be seen as a generalisation
of Theorem 5 in that it allows the learner to learn more compact action models
in which maximal consistency of preconditions is not enforced (on the contrary,
by the way the min operator is defined above, the learner will learn an action
model with minimal preconditions). For instance, in the case of the n-bit counter
considered in Example 5, it can be shown that the learner will learn the action
model with n+ 1 events instead of the one with 2n events.
4 Action library learning
In this section we introduce action library learning. This is the type of learning
most relevant in planning. A finite set of action names is available to the agent.
In order to plan a sequence of actions towards a goal it is essential to know
what the corresponding actions do. As most of the results in this section are
straightforward generalizations of our previous results, for the sake of space we
will omit all proofs.
An action library corresponds to what is called a planning domain (and
sometimes also an action library) in classical planning: a specification of the
available actions and their action schemas. Action library learning is the learning
problem where the agent is initially only given a set A of action names and has
to learn the action library l : A → Actions(P ). That is, the agent initially only
knows the names of the available actions, and it then learns the action models
that correspond to those names.
Definition 14 (Action library). Let P denote a set of atomic propositions,
and let A denote a finite set, the set of action names. An action library over
P,A is a mapping l : A→ Actions(P ) (a mapping from action names into action
models). If all actions in the codomain of l enjoy property X, then l is called an
X action library (e.g., a deterministic action library l is one where all action
models in the codomain of l are deterministic).
Streams and learning functions for action libraries are defined similarly to
the case of individual actions. Let P be a set of atomic propositions, and A a
set of action names. A stream over P,A is an infinite sequence of triples (s, a, s′)
where s, s′ are propositional states over P and a ∈ A. Notations En, E [n], set(E)
and set(E [n]) are defined similarly to Definition 5. Given a ∈ A, the a-substream
of E is given by Ea = {(s, s′) | (s, a, s′) ∈ set(E)}. Let l be an action library
over P,A. A stream for l is an infinite sequence of triples (s, a, s′) where s, s′ are
propositional states over P , a ∈ A and s′ ∈ s⊗ l(a). A library learning function
over P,A is a mapping L : (P(P ) × A × P(P ))∗ → ((A → Actions(P )) ∪ {↑}).
Given a learning function L for individual actions over P (Definition 7), we
define the induced library learning function L over P,A by
1. L(E) := ↑ if L(Ea) = ↑ for some a ∈ A.
2. Otherwise, for all a ∈ A, L(E)(a) := L(Ea).
From Theorem 6 we then immediately get the following.
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Theorem 7. The class of deterministic action libraries is finitely identifiable by
the library learning function Lupdate3 (induced from L
update
3 of Theorem 6).
Example 7. Consider the electrical circuit below consisting of two switches (1
and 2), a voltage source (left) and a light bulb (right).
1
2
When both switches are closed, the light will be on, otherwise it will be off.
Let proposition si denote that switch i is closed and let l denote that the light
is on. Assume the available actions are flip1 and flip2 that flip switch 1 and
2, respectively. Consider an agent trying to learn how the switches and the
circuit work. This agent then tries to learn an action library over {s1, s2, l},
{flip1, f lip2}. Given a stream E for the action library, it can be shown that the
learning function Lupdate3 will eventually return the following action library that
describes it (note that it can be described in many equivalent ways).
l(flip1) = 〈¬s1∧¬s2, s1∧¬l〉, 〈¬s1∧s2, s1∧l〉, 〈s1∧¬s2,¬s1∧¬l〉, 〈s1∧s2,¬s1∧¬l〉
l(flip2) = 〈¬s1∧¬s2, s2∧¬l〉, 〈¬s1∧s2,¬s2∧¬l〉, 〈s1∧¬s2, s2∧l〉, 〈s1∧s2,¬s2∧¬l〉
5 Conclusions and related work
This paper is the first to study the problem of learnability of action models in
dynamic epistemic logic (DEL). We provided an original learnability framework
and several early results concerning fully observable propositional action models
with respect to conclusive (finite identifiability) and inconclusive (identifiability
in the limit) learnability. Apart from those general results, we proposed various
learning functions which code particular learning algorithms. Here, by imple-
menting the update method (commonly used in DEL), we demonstrated how
the learning of action models can be seen as transitioning from nondeterministic
to deterministic actions.
Related work A similar qualitative approach to learning actions has been ad-
dressed by [18] within the STRIPS planning formalism. The STRIPS setting is
more general than ours in that it uses atoms of first-order predicate logic for
pre- and postconditions. It is however less general in neglecting various aspects
of actions which we have successfully treated in this paper: negative precondi-
tions (i.e., negative literals as precondition conjuncts), negative postconditions,
conditional effects (which we achieve through non-atomic action models). We
believe that the ideas introduced here can be applied to generalize the results of
[18] to richer planning frameworks allowing such action types. It is also worth
mentioning here that there has been quite substantial amount of work in relating
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DEL and learning theory (see [11,12] for overviews), which concerns a different
setting: treating update and upgrade revision policies as long term learning meth-
ods, where learning can be seen as convergence to certain types of knowledge
(see [3,4,5]). A study of abstract properties of finite identifiability in a setting
similar to ours, including various efficiency considerations, can be found in [13].
Further directions In this short paper we only considered fully observable
actions applied in fully observable states, and hence did not use the full ex-
pressive power of the DEL formalism. The latter still remains adequate, since
action models provide a very well-structured and principled way of describing
actions in a logical setting, and since its use opens ways to various extensions.
The next steps are to cover more DEL action models: those with arbitrary pre-
and postconditions, and those with partial observability and multiple agents.
As described earlier, partially observable actions are not learnable in the strict
sense considered above, but we can still investigate agents learning “as much as
possible” given their limitations in observability. The multi-agent case is par-
ticularly interesting due to the possibility of agents with varied limitations on
observability, and the possibility of communication within the learning process.
We plan to study the computational complexity of learning proposed in this
paper, but also to investigate other more space-efficient learning algorithms. We
are also interested algorithms that produce minimal action models. For instance,
if we allow action models that have event postconditions specified as mappings
from propositions to formulas (as is standard in DEL), then the action library for
the circuit of Example 7 can be described using only 2 events. However, learning
such minimal action descriptions might turn out to be computationally much
harder. Furthermore, we here considered only what we call reactive learning: the
learner has no influence over observations. We would also like to study the case
of proactive learning, where the learner gets to choose which actions to execute,
and hence observe their effects. This is probably the most relevant type of learn-
ing for a general learning-and-planning agent. In this context, we also plan to
focus on consecutive streams : streams corresponding to executing sequences of
actions rather than observing arbitrary state transitions. Our ultimate aim is
to relate learning and planning within the framework of DEL. Those two cogni-
tive capabilities are now investigated mostly in separation—our goal is to bridge
them.
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